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MISSOC Analysis 2008 
 
Social Protection: Aspects of Flexicurity and Active Inclusion 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
I.1. The background to MISSOC Analysis 
 
The MISSOC Analysis, a document from the MISSOC Secretariat, is a new output of the 
Mutual Information System on Social Protection and is presented for the first time in 2008. 
This document intends to provide an analytical overview of significant developments in 
selected fields of social protection and to explore how these developments relate to changes in 
social protection legislation over time. In addition to providing accurate information, the 
MISSOC Analysis should contribute to work within the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) in the field of social protection and inclusion.  
 
The MISSOC Analysis is based on information found in the MISSOC tables, and is as such 
an exercise about how these regular updates of social security legislation can be used in a 
more policy-oriented way. The data of these tables also limit the scope of this report as the 
tables only contain information on statutory schemes of social protection but no information 
on complementary systems.  
 
The data from the MISSOC tables are described and contextualised against the backdrop of 
the theoretical policy framework set by key documents in the field of European Social Policy. 
The MISSOC Analysis also intends to be a concrete instrument for policy-making by linking 
overall developments and mechanisms to existing practices in the participating countries. This 
MISSOC analysis looks to the prevailing context and to the developments that took place 
between 2004 and today.  
 
Experts from the MISSOC Secretariat [currently contracted to Bernard Brunhes International 
(BBI)] have drafted this paper in consultation with the European Commission and the 
National Correspondents from the countries that participate in MISSOC. This document is 
however the only responsibility of the Secretariat. Prof. Yves Jorens (Scientific mentor in the 
MISSOC secretariat) took lead responsibility for developing this document, in close 
collaboration with Prof. Saskia Klosse. 
 
 
I.2. The rationale for selecting ‘flexicurity and active inclusion’ as a theme  
 
• The Renewed Lisbon Strategy: Towards socially inclusive economies 
 
Originally conceived as a Dutch or Danish phenomenon combining flexible employment 
protection legislation with a high level of social security benefits, flexicurity has now become 
a leading concept in the field of European social policy. Current social policy debates around 
‘flexicurity’ address the challenge of reconciling adequate and efficient social security 
provision, on the one hand, with structural changes that demand more flexible and 
deregulated labour markets, on the other. The concept of flexicurity reflects the idea that 
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flexibility and security are not contradictory to one another, but can in many situations be 
mutually supportive. 
 
In this sense, flexicurity is needed to achieve the objectives of the renewed Lisbon Strategy 
for Growth and Jobs which aims at combining economic and employment growth with greater 
social cohesion. This means in particular more and better jobs, while modernising the 
European social model at the same time. It involves the deliberate combination of flexible and 
reliable contractual arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, effective active 
labour market policies and modern adequate and sustainable social protection systems. 
Modern social security systems should provide adequate income support, encourage 
employment and facilitate labour market mobility and secure transitions from job to job. This 
includes broad coverage of social protection provisions that help people combine work with 
private and family responsibilities. The debate on flexicurity deals therefore with the issue of 
a further interconnection between work and welfare issues or the so-called activating welfare 
state.  
 
However, if the Union is to make full use of its potential of human resources, economic, 
employment and social development must go hand in hand. To guide the Member States in 
the process of finding ways to bring this about, the Guidelines for Growth and Jobs indicate 
pathways upon which Member States can build their policies. These policies should include 
active inclusion policies that target increasing labour supply at the same time as strengthening 
society’s cohesiveness.  
 
Within this context, Member States should take measures that are geared to remove barriers to 
the labour market, for example, by ensuring effective job search assistance and access to 
(vocational) training and other active labour market measures. Member States should also 
guarantee the availability of affordable social services and provide adequate levels of 
minimum resources to all. This type of measure should be complemented by other measures 
to ensure that taking up work pays and that remove unemployment, poverty and inactivity 
traps. In addition, Member States should develop new sources of jobs in response to collective 
needs, for example through the expansion of the social economy so as to create supportive 
work environments for vulnerable groups by providing services for individuals or local 
businesses which are not met by the market economy.1  
 
In developing and implementing their policies, Member States should pay special attention to 
promoting the active inclusion of young and older people, long-term unemployed as well as 
disadvantaged groups such as the low-skilled, people with disabilities, immigrants and ethnic 
minorities. As far as the last three groups are concerned, Member States should intensify their 
actions to combat discrimination.  
 
•  The link between flexicurity and active inclusion 
                                             
1 COM(2007) 803, Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2008-2010), p. 28-29. See in this respect in 
particular Guideline nr. 19 which invites the Member States more explicitly to ensure inclusive labour markets, 
enhance attractiveness and make work pay for jobseekers, including disadvantaged people and the inactive 
through: 1) active and preventive labour market measures including early identification of needs, job search 
assistance, guidance and training as part of personalised action plans, provision of necessary social services to 
support the inclusion of those furthest away from the labour market and contribute to the eradication of poverty; 
2) continual review of (dis)incentives resulting from tax and benefit systems, including the management and 
conditionality of benefits and a significant reduction of high marginal effective tax rates, notably for those with 
low incomes, whilst ensuring adequate levels of social protection and 3) development of new sources of jobs in 
services for individuals and businesses, notably at the local level. 
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Whereas flexicurity policies aim to facilitate safe labour market transitions and progress in 
employment, active inclusion policies focus on those at the margins of the labour market by 
providing personalised pathways to employment for those who can work, whilst at the same 
time ensuring that those who cannot work can live a life in dignity and contribute as much as 
possible to society.2 Both types of policy are to be pursued simultaneously in order to meet 
the Union’s objective of mobilising its full potential of human resources.  
 
Labour market integration often needs to be joined up with a range of social services. This is 
even more pressing in view of the new social risks that have emerged as a result of 
demographic change and the trend towards greater individualisation.3 In addition, supported 
employment opportunities, provided by social enterprises within the framework of the social 
economy, may be needed for those most remote from the labour market. Active inclusion 
policies recognise that this can be a useful path towards integration, which can bridge the 
transition from the situation where individuals are fully dependent on social assistance and to 
their participation in the labour market. 
 
Having succeeded in finding work, continued support may be needed in terms of, for 
example, training on-the-job and suitable work arrangements to help marginalised people 
reconcile work with their disadvantages, such as lack of appropriate accommodation or health 
problems. Consequently, active inclusion policies also promote job retention as a means to 
avoid this group having to leave the job again due to, for example, inadequate employment 
skills or because the personal or social hurdles are not adequately addressed.4 Active inclusion 
policies are fully complementary to flexicurity policies in this way. In fact, they complete the 
flexicurity picture by adopting a wider approach in combining income support and activation 
policies with the Union’s policies on social protection and social inclusion which aim at 
preventing social exclusion, (child) poverty and inequality.  
 
The interplay between labour markets and welfare states is at the core of debate in Europe. 
Although flexicurity might at first appear to align more closely to the interests of employers, 
in fact it also brings benefits to employees. A variety of reasons can underline the need for 
flexicurity, such as the desire to better combine family and work or to take career breaks for 
either care or study leave. Different needs at different phases of the life course may result in a 
variety of career trajectories with fluctuations in the volume of working hours or with career 
breaks. 
                                             
2 See in this respect the Commission’s Communication COM(2007) 620 , Modernising social protection for 
greater social justice and economic cohesion: taking forward the active inclusion of people furthest away from 
the labour market, p. 2. 
3 See on this matter the Commission’s Communication COM(2007) 620, Modernising social protection for 
greater social justice and economic cohesion: taking forward the active inclusion of people furthest away from 
the labour market, p. 5. In this respect, it should be noted that improving access to quality social services is one 
of the key priorities set by the Member States for tackling poverty and social exclusion. See for example Council 
Decision of 12 July 2005 on Guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, OJ L 205 of 6 
August 2005, p. 21. 
4 See in this respect the Commission’s Communication COM(2007) 620, Modernising social protection for 
greater social justice and economic cohesion: taking forward the active inclusion of people furthest away from 
the labour market, p. 3 and 5. 
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II. Flexicurity and Social Protection: clarification of concepts and method 
 
II.1. Flexibility and security  
 
Taking into account the frequent use of the concept of flexibility, and acknowledging it to be 
a broad term with different meanings, it is important to elaborate a clear definition. Having in 
mind the well-known OECD-template5, a distinction can be made, on the one hand, between 
‘external’ and on the other hand, ‘internal’ flexibility, the latter being of two kinds. External 
numerical flexibility describes numerical adjustments to the work force by companies. 
Internal numerical flexibility is based on adjustments to employees’ hours, using time 
accounts or reductions in working time. Contrary to external flexibility, the number of 
employees remains constant. Internal functional flexibility involves a reversal of the division 
of labour and the fragmentation of work organisation and as such implies a reaction to 
changing production of service needs by adjusting work organisation systems and focussing 
on employees’ multi-skilling, an adaptation strategy designed to permit deployment at 
different work places to meet fluctuating market demands. 
 
The Wilthagen Matrix describes the combination between these different forms of flexibility 
with the different forms of security, as there are job-security, employment security, income 
security and combination security.6 Job security implies the security of being able to stay in 
the same job and which can be expressed via employment protection in tenure with the same 
employer. Employment security means security of staying employed, although not necessarily 
in the same job. Here, the general employment situation, active labour market, training and 
education policies are playing a key role. Thirdly, there is income security, directly related to 
the function of social security in the provision of income in case of unemployment, sickness 
or accident and is expressed through the public transfer of income, such as unemployment and 
cash benefit systems. Finally, we also speak about combination security, the possibilities 
available for combining work and private life, as for example, through retirement schemes, 
maternity leave, voluntary sector activity and paid work, etc. While job and employment 
security tend to relate to the new patterns of work, social security is more related to income 
security.  
 
Flexibility/security Income security Combination security 
External numerical 
flexibility 
 Unemployment compensation 
 Other social benefits 
 Minimum wages 
 Protection against dismissal 
during various leave 
schemes 
Internal numerical 
flexibility 
 Part-time supplementary benefit 
 Study grants 
 Sickness benefit 
 Different kind of leave 
schemes 
 Part-time pension 
Functional flexibility  Performance related pay systems  Voluntary working time 
arrangements 
Labour cost/wage 
flexibility 
 Collective wage agreements 
 Adjusted benefit for shortened 
work week  
 Voluntary working time 
arrangements 
 
                                             
5 See OECD, Labour Market Flexibility: Trends in Enterprises, Paris, 1989.  
6 See Wilthagen, T., and Tros, F., The concept of flexicurity: a newer approach to regulating employment labour 
markets, Transfer 2/04.  
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II.2. Social protection support in transitional life stages 
 
The impact of greater flexibility on social protection schemes poses considerable risks. Social 
protection systems in Europe were mostly constructed around an ‘ideal-type’: a typical male 
breadwinner, someone with a dependent, long-lasting, full-time work relationship. In recent 
years, however, employees who work 40 years within the same company have become a 
small minority. It is now much more common for people to switch from job to job and from 
employer to employer.  
 
 
• Flexible working patterns 
 
In a growing and dynamic labour market people switch between employment and self-
employment; between employment, part-time work and unemployment; between different 
employers. People move more frequently between private activities and non-market activities 
such as caring for children, or disabled relatives, or just to continue their studies or training. 
People are looking for ways to be able to fully participate in all the spheres of social life, 
allowing them to improve their quality of life. People are also increasingly interested in 
deciding for themselves how to allocate their time to working, learning, caring and other 
activities during the various stages of life.  
 
Patterns of part-time work, flexible working-time schedules, working-time accounts, leave for 
caring or parental responsibilities, educational leave, career breaks, sabbaticals, working-time 
reduction on a daily, weekly, monthly or yearly basis, early retirement schemes… have 
become more and more common and change to a considerable extent the organisation of 
working life. It is becoming increasingly evident that the trend is towards a more flexible 
working life course in which work, learning, caring and leisure time no longer follow the 
classic chronological sequence, but are increasingly organised in mixed sequences, or even in 
variable and individualised combinations, over the course of each individual’s life. 
 
A modern and activating social system should therefore facilitate transitions between the 
different stages and make it easier for citizens to make their own decisions about optimal 
working, care and living patterns. Such activities, through their element of voluntary choice, 
are traditionally excluded from social security, because they create the problem of moral 
hazard. Social security should provide custom-made solution for the needs of different people, 
following different labour market patterns as well as allowing transitions between the 
different phases of life.  
 
As a consequence of these tendencies, a growing institutional framework is being established 
in Member States, allowing people to better combine work with care, education or other non-
market social activities.7 Different leave facilities have been installed for different reasons.  
 
• Educational leave 
 
In several countries (Austria, Estonia, Slovenia, France, Bulgaria, Portugal, Latvia, Sweden) 
systems exist allowing people to interrupt their occupational activities for educational 
reasons; paid (Austria, Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria) or unpaid (Czech Republic, Portugal, 
                                             
7 It has to be mentioned that apart from mechanisms in statutory legislation, many more possibilities for further 
flexibility will depend on arrangements in collective labour agreements or in the individual labour contract.  
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Denmark). In many cases however it is up to the employer to decide and the conditions will 
have to be determined on the basis of mutual agreement between employer and employee.  
 
Participation of the working age population in education and training could avoid skill gaps in 
the labour market and would fit into the lifelong learning strategy. In some other countries, 
people can interrupt their activities regardless the reason (Belgium, Spain).  
 
• Parental leave 
 
Apart from periods for educational leave, different forms of parental leave have been 
introduced in the different Member States, not at least as a result of EU directive 96/34.  
Together with maternity and paternity leave (which is mostly limited in time), parental leave 
allows people to combine their role as a worker with that of a parent.8 However its duration 
and characteristics vary between the countries. While in some countries, the duration of 
parental leave is limited to a number of weeks (Portugal 15 days, father only; UK and Cyprus 
13 weeks; Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands 3 months; Greece 3.5 months), in other 
countries parental leave can be taken up for several months (Luxembourg, 6 months; Italy 10 
months) or even years (Austria 2 years; Poland, Lithuania, Malta, Spain and Slovakia 3 years; 
Czech Republic 4 years). In Finland parents have the right to leave (or to shorter working 
hours) as long as the child is younger than three years (per child), while keeping their 
employment relationship. In case the child is not placed in a public kindergarten, they will 
receive a benefit.  
 
Differences also exist with respect to the maximum age of the child, for which parental leave 
can be taken (Latvia 1 year; Austria 2 years; Estonia, Germany, Spain, Lithuania, Slovakia 
and Hungary 3 years; Belgium 6 years; and Malta, Netherlands; Bulgaria and Sweden 8 
years). Where some countries provide for relatively high earnings replacement benefits 
[between 100 and 70 % (e.g. Estonia, Sweden, Slovenia, Latvia, Finland, Hungary and 
Denmark) or 30% (Italy)], several other countries foresee lump-sums (Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Austria and Luxembourg), while in many other 
countries it is unpaid (Netherlands, Spain, Greece, Ireland, UK, Cyprus, Malta and Bulgaria). 
Several countries also foresee a separate right for fathers (e.g. Sweden, Finland, Austria and 
Italy). In several countries parental leave can also be taken as a part-time option, although 
other countries do not foresee this possibility of part-time work (e.g. Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Italy, Poland and Latvia).  
                                             
8 Another option allowing people to spend more time to the education of their children or for whatever other 
reason, could be to reduce working hours or to start working part-time. We would like to highlight here that in 
the framework of parental leave some Member States have set up a whole institutional framework providing 
services. As this paper only looks at social protection measures, this framework is not included.  
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Table 1: Overview of parental leave and career break 
 
COUNTRY PARENTAL LEAVE 
 
CAREER BREAK: POSSIBILITIES 
 maximum 
duration 
paid/ 
unpaid 
Flat-rate/ 
percentage 
means 
tested 
maximum 
age child 
Reason: 
study  
Paid/ 
unpaid 
Maximum 
Duration 
Austria 24 months  
 
flat-rate (soc. 
sec.) allowance 
not linked to 
parental leave 
with max. of 36 
months (if both 
parents take 
care) 
Partly 
(incom
e limit) 
2 years No legal 
entitlement; 
agreement 
between 
employer 
and 
employee 
Paid soc. 
Sec. 
benefit 
3-12 
Months 
Belgium 3 months Flat-rate sum No 6 years Yes, no 
particular 
one  
Paid 1 Year 
Bulgaria 6 months (every 
parent) 
Unpaid No 8 years No special 
interruption 
study/ study 
leave  
Paid study 
leave 
25 days per 
year 
Czech 
Republic 
4 years flat-rate, very 
low allowance 
No 4 years No particular 
rule for 
studies, 
agreement 
between 
employer/em
ployee, no 
right 
Unpaid   
Cyprus 13 weeks unpaid No 6 Years No general 
right 
  
Denmark 52 weeks paid: 90% of 
earnings 
(through 
agreement full 
wage 24 w)  
No 9 years (for 
32 weeks) 
Specific 
labour 
market 
agreement 
  
Estonia 3 years 
(18 months 
parental benefit 
then child care 
allowance) 
Paid: parental 
leave 100% 
previous wage, 
followed by 
flat-rate child 
allowance 
No 3 years Study leave Paid: 10 
days 
average 
wage/ 
afterwards
: 
minimum 
wage 
Duration 
Study 
session, 
min. 30 
days/acade
mic year 
Finland -158 working 
days (twins: plus 
60 days) 
(can be divided 
between mother 
or father or 
mother can take 
total period 
-Mothers and 
fathers have to 
right to leave or 
to shorter 
working hours 
whenever child is 
Paid: 70% of 
the salary; if 
income is under 
EUR 6500/year: 
minimum cash 
benefit 
 
-Right to child 
home care 
benefit 
No No 
maximum 
age but has 
to be taken 
immediatel
y after 
maternity 
(postponem
ent in 
exceptional 
reasons) 
-Study leave 
if at least one 
year working 
relationship 
to the same 
employer 
 
 
 
 
-Regardless 
the reason: if 
employer 
employs an 
-Paid in 
case no 
wage or 
salary is 
paid: lump 
sum of 
EUR 500 
/month 
plus 
additional 
amount 
based on 
20% of 
income 
Minimum 2 
months  
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younger than 3 
years (per child) 
unemployed 
and if 10 
years period 
of work/one 
year for 
current 
employer 
and 12 
months 
during last 
13 months 
-special 
arrangements 
in case of 
sick child 
under 
EUR 2700 
/month 
and 15% 
of income 
above this 
sum 
-Paid: 70 
or 80% of 
unemploy
ment 
benefit if 
member of 
unemploy
ment fund; 
if not flat-
rate 
amount 
France  3 years Paid: lump-sum, 
6 months for the 
first child, 3 
years from 
second child on 
No 3 years Different 
reasons 
Leave for 
training: 
paid  
For other 
reasons: 
not paid 
 
Germany 12 months  Percentage 
wage with 
ceilings 
No 3 years    
Greece 3,5 months unpaid No 3.5 years No specific 
rule, 
discretionary 
power 
employer 
Unpaid  
Hungary 3 types of 
benefits: 
maternity 
allowance/child 
care fee and child 
home care 
allowance: last 
one maximum 3 
years 
paid: 70% of the 
earnings, up to 
ceiling until 
child is 2 years 
or 3rd year lower 
flat-rate 
payment 
No 3 years No general 
possibility, 
few 
exceptions: 
nursing 
relatives  
unpaid 2 years 
(relatives) 
Ireland 3 months unpaid No 5 years    
Italy 10 months earnings related: 
30% of earnings 
 
No 8 years    
Latvia 1 year 70% contrib. 
wage 
No 1 year Study leave Paid Not less 
than 20 
days per 
year 
Liechtenstei
n  
3 months unpaid No 3 years (5 
in case of 
adoption or 
handicappe
d child) 
Leave for 
taking care 
of sick 
children/me
mbers of 
family  
Paid 3 days for 
each case  
Lithuania 3 years Paid: percentage 
0-2 years, lump 
sum 2-3 years) 
No 3 years Study 
vacation 
possible 
Agreemen
t with 
employer 
Agreement 
with 
employer 
Luxembourg 6 months full 
time for each 
flat-rate 
allowance 
No 5 years Individual 
leave for 
100% 
wage by 
80 days 
over whole 
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parent long life 
learning 
employer 
(who is 
reimburse
d by 
Ministry) 
career, max. 
20 d. over 2 
years 
Malta Minimum 3 
months/child but 
employer may 
provide longer  
unpaid No 8 years No No No 
The 
Netherlands 
3 months unpaid No 8 years    
Poland 3 years flat-rate 
allowance 
Yes 4 years    
Portugal fathers 15 days of 
parental leave 
following 
maternity or 
maternity leave 
Paid for the first 
15 days (father) 
100% of 
earnings 
No After birth No (but can 
ask employer 
for training 
leaves) 
Unpaid   
Romania 2 years Flat-rate No 2 years    
Slovakia 3 years Flat-rate No 3 years    
Slovenia (3 kind of 
benefits: 
maternity/paternit
y and child care 
leave) 
260 days child 
care plus 105 
maternity leave: 
365 days 
paid: 100% 
replacement 
 
No In principle 
immediatel
y after 
birth, 8 
years (75 
days);  
Study  Paid In contract 
of 
education 
or 
collective 
agreement 
Spain 3 years unpaid No 3 years No rule for 
study/ 
interruption 
possible 
Unpaid  Min. 4 
months 
max. 5 
years 
Sweden 480 days to be 
divided between 
both parents 
paid: 390 days 
80% flat ceiling 
+ 90 days flat-
rate benefit 
not earnings 
related 
No 8 years Legal 
entitlement 
to career 
break for 
studies 
Unpaid 
unless 
other 
agreement 
with 
employer 
No limit 
UK 13 weeks unpaid No (but 
means-
tested 
Income 
support 
5 years No No No 
 
 
II.3. Challenges for Social Protection  
 
From the moment social security systems assume the existence of an employment situation, 
and as such make some of the benefits conditional upon it, there is a big risk that people in an 
atypical working situation will lose their guarantee of security. This conflict of flexibility and 
social protection can be noticed in every Member State, regardless the model of social 
security9 (conservative/corporatist, liberal, Scandinavian/social democratic or Mediterranean) 
                                             
9 See the following for an extensive discussion of the relationship between welfare models and flexibility: 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Working time options over the 
life course: Changing social security structures, Dublin, 2005, and European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, Flexibility and social protection, Dublin, 2003.  
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and notwithstanding the differences with respect to labour market integration. However, it can 
obviously be noticed that conservative corporatist welfare regimes where a clear link exists 
between the equivalence principle and the insurance principle (close link between social 
benefits and earlier occupational activity) will get more easily into conflict with a flexible 
reorganisation of working life. In liberal welfare states with a low level of decommodification 
through social security benefits systems, the arrangements on company level may however 
have an impact on the flexicurity.    
 
In countries where social protection strongly relies on statutory insurance, registered 
unemployment usually gives access to health care and the pension system. Pension 
entitlement is also built up during unemployment, although the transfer ratio is much reduced. 
As such these elements are possible impediments to a fully realised and flexible life course.  
On the contrary, in countries where medical treatment is granted to the whole population, it is 
less important how employment interruptions are classified, because basic rights to health 
care are not affected by employment status and the classification of employment 
interruptions. The same holds for entitlement to citizenship-based basic pensions.  
 
For the person concerned it is important to know that these possible and different time options 
offer not only flexibility to pursue non-market activities but do so without loss of employment 
or social security rights. 
 
From our perspective flexicurity can therefore be described consistently with Wilthagen’s 
definition as being a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and deliberately, to enhance 
the flexibility of labour markets, work organisation and labour relations on the one hand and 
to enhance security – employment security and social security – notably for weaker groups in 
and outside the labour market on the other hand.10 
 
The key point of this analysis is to question the extent to which social security contributes to 
greater flexibility within labour market and across the life course. Flexicurity in our approach 
is a process, where social security goes hand in hand with a flexible labour market and is not 
just a reaction to further flexibility. We therefore do not immediately look - as is so often the 
case - at the way social security reacts to different new patterns of work and, if and to what 
extent, special provisions have been enacted to ensure social protection for workers with a-
typical jobs. We could even argue that the social security situation of people with an a-typical 
work pattern, is more precisely styled a labour law question, namely if a-typical forms of 
work can be considered as a ‘normal’ labour contract. Social security might at different 
moments interfere in a smooth transition between these different phases of life. In particular 
possible impediments might be encountered at three stages:11 at the stage of the access to 
social security, at the stage of the level of benefits or at the stage of their duration. For each of 
these stages, some examples were selected where a-typical work could lead to a reduction in 
the amount of cash benefits from the social security system and where social security might as 
such have an impact on a smooth transition between these different phases.   
 
III. Social Protection and Flexicurity 
 
III.1. Access to social security  
                                             
10 See Wilthagen, T., and Tros, F., The concept of flexicurity: a newer approach to regulating employment 
labour markets, Transfer 2/04.  
11 Apart from these elements there is the question of to what extent flexibility has an impact on the financial 
sustainability of the social security systems. This question is not answered here.  
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1. Transition between jobs 
 
Social security might include provisions which can facilitate a smooth transition between 
jobs, or more specifically, between part-time working and full-time employment, thereby 
protecting those who might otherwise be excluded from social protection because they do not 
work a certain number of hours or do not reach a minimum wage level.  
 
In several countries, people are indeed excluded from social insurance entitlements due to 
their limited number of hours of work or low income. 
 
 Country 
 
Exempted from compulsory insurance 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal 
Earnings 
AT In case of an income less than EUR 349.01, there is only 
compulsory insurance under the insurance for accidents (labour 
accidents and occupational diseases). No compulsory insurance 
therefore in all other branches.  
DE up to EUR 400/month under the health care (medical care as well as 
cash benefits) invalidity and old-age pension system 
CZ  less than EUR 14/month 
IE less than EUR 38/week 
SK Self-employed people under the invalidity and old-age system in 
case of an annual income of less than 12 times the minimum 
monthly wage 
UK less than EUR 117/week, or for self-employed annual earnings less 
than EUR 6,244 
 
 
Limited hours  
of work 
ES / LU Occasionally and not regularly in a professional activity and where 
the period of activity does not exceed three months per calendar year 
under sickness cash benefits 
CZ Less than 7 successive calendar days/month 
LI Less than 8 working hours/week with an employer or is employed 
for a maximum of 3 months 
 
 
 
2. Transition between employment and self-employment 
 
Switching from employment to self-employment might also result in disadvantages. Self-
employed people traditionally have less social protection when compared to employed 
persons, as they are considered to be capable of organising their own protection against social 
risks. Enhancing the rights of social security or even opening up systems to self-employed 
traditionally reserved for wage earners, would contribute to further flexibility.   
 
A typical example is the opening of the right to unemployment benefits. In Belgium the 
special benefits paid out in case of bankruptcy (a kind of “unemployment benefits for self-
employed”) have been introduced. Unemployed people trying to escape from unemployment 
by starting a self-employed business will be considered to have fulfilled the conditions for 
insurance for a maximum period of 15 years if their self-employed activities turn out to be not 
successful. Since a number of years, self-employed people are obliged to affiliate with the 
unemployment insurance scheme in Hungary. In Germany, since 2006, there is a possibility to 
opt for the continuation of insurance against unemployment for persons who have been 
compulsorily insured against unemployment as employees for at least 12 months during the 
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24 months preceding the independent activity or have received unemployment benefits. So 
also in Germany, unemployment benefits are available to the self-employed. 
 
Furthermore in Belgium from January 1st 2008 onwards, self-employed people are also 
insured for the so-called “small risks” under the medical care scheme, equalising them in that 
respect to employed people. In addition, the right to maternity benefit and the level of family 
benefits have been extended. In Cyprus, the waiting period for cash benefits for sickness has 
been decreased from 18 to nine days. In order to be treated in the same way as employed 
persons, the self-employed person today needs to be hospitalised for at least one day instead 
of six days as it was previously. 
 
 
3. Transition between unemployment/sickness and employment 
 
The traditional passive strategy towards unemployed people leads to an increasing number of 
people living on income support and a growing and larger group of people excluded from the 
labour market. To allow a better transition between the phase of unemployment and a job, a 
growing number of activation measures have been adopted in the social security systems.  
 
While the condition for looking for a job or accepting suitable employment offers is already 
since many years a condition in the Member States for obtaining unemployment benefits, a 
further strengthening of these conditions can be noticed during these last years in several 
Member States. In different countries there is a clear tendency to individualise this condition 
for looking for work and to follow-up (and examine more closely) the circumstances of the 
unemployed person.  
 
Related to strengthened activation measures in employment insurance, one can also identify 
the introduction of further stricter sanctions for unemployed persons that fail to comply with 
their duty to actively look for a job. In Germany a reduction by 30% of unemployment benefit 
applies, if one does not make an effort to participate in the labour market or does not accept a 
reasonable employment. In Italy, an extra sanction was introduced for those people who 
refused to attend recycling training courses.  
 
All these active labour market measures should be seen as encouragement to find new 
employment.  
 
Recently introduced measures in unemployment schemes to stimulate 
activation 
 
Countries 
General obligation (or strengthening of this obligation) to search actively 
for work as conditions for benefits 
AT / BE / CY / EE / FR 
/ LU / SP / PT / FI / SI / 
SK 
Individualised follow-up/personalised action plan of condition to look for 
work  
DK / LT / HU / FR / SE 
/ UK 
Stricter sanctions when not actively looking for a job BE / EE / LT / PT / DE / 
IT 
 
Tighter eligibility criteria apply not only in the unemployment system, but also in respect of 
social security for the long-term sick and disabled. This corresponds to the principles of the 
so-called ‘activating welfare state’ where opportunities for early retirement may be abandoned 
or re-structured and where later retirement triggers entitlement to other (unemployment or 
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disability) benefits. Many countries offer the possibility of partial disability benefits (e.g. 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal) instead of “all or nothing” benefits so that work disincentive effects can be 
minimised. In recent years there has been greater emphasis on developing active work 
strategies. On the one hand partial benefits were abolished or the requirements for obtaining 
full benefits were strengthened. In the past people with a part-time incapacity often received 
full benefits. Many countries now prescribe that full benefits can only be obtained by people 
who are without prospect of further employment (e.g. Malta, Denmark, UK).  
 
On the other hand, part-time options should make it easier for disabled workers to remain in 
the labour market in both the short and the long run and so reduce the prevailing tendency for 
their early exit.12 As we will see later on, the receipt of part-time benefits while being active 
in the labour market is increasingly common.  
 
In the Netherlands an entirely new disability benefit system was introduced in 2006. The new 
scheme has two components: A permanent disability benefit for people who can no longer 
work and another benefit for individuals with a disability that is either partial or not 
permanent. The first category comprises permanently disabled workers with at least 80% 
reduction of their earnings capacity, who receive a disability benefit at a level of 75% of their 
last wage. Workers with an earnings capacity reduction of 15-34% can no longer receive a 
disability benefit. Instead, their employment relationship is maintained (if possible) and the 
employer will have to adapt the workplace if necessary. In case of job loss they are, after 
exhaustion of sickness benefits, treated on the same basis as other unemployed people. 
Workers with an incapacity of 35-79% and those who are fully but not permanently disabled 
are entitled to a benefit that is higher if the employee is working for at least 50% of the 
remaining capacity. After a period of five years, this benefit will be reduced to a flat-rate 
payment if the worker is not utilising that capacity. Both these elements are designed to 
improve work incentives.  
 
 
In the UK, the new Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) will replace the incapacity 
benefit and income support paid on the grounds of incapacity. It will focus on capability for 
work rather than benefit entitlement or incapacity. It is intended to start for new claimants 
from October 2008. From April 2010 all existing incapacity benefits claimants will be 
required to take the work capability assessment. Anyone claiming ESA will be assessed over 
a 13 week period, or longer if necessary, to determine whether they have a limited capability 
for work but also whether or not he or she is capable of ‘engaging in work-related activity’. 
Those who cannot engage in work-related activity will receive a 'support component'. Those 
who can engage in work-related activity will receive a 'work-related activity component' but 
may be required to do three things as part of the ‘conditionality’ for receiving this component: 
a) they may have a work-focused health-related assessment aimed at providing additional 
information about the claimant's functional capacity; b) attending a work-focused interview to 
discuss what steps they can take to move towards work, and c) undertake activities that 
increase the likelihood of getting a job. This may include activities such as work trials, 
training, or attending a programme designed to help them manage their condition.  
 
 
                                             
12 See also OECD, Transforming Disability into Ability: Policies to Promote Work and Income Security for 
Disabled People, Paris, 2003. 
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4. Some other elements of influence 
 
Some other elements that might influence flexibility and in particular the transition between 
unemployment and employment, relates to the strengthening of the necessary qualifying 
period for unemployment insurance. Variables such as the number of years of contribution, in 
particular in combination with a short qualifying period during which these years of 
contribution have to fulfilled, might complicate access to social security.  In recent years, 
some countries have introduced stricter qualifying periods. 
 
Stricter qualifying periods for unemployment benefits: 
 
Countries 
12 months during last 2 years (instead of 12 m during last 3 years) 
 
DE 
3 months during last year (instead of 10 weeks during last year)  
 
IS 
365 days during last 4 years (instead of 200 days over last 4 years) 
 
HU 
80 hrs/month over last year or 480 hrs with at least 50 hrs/month over last 
year (instead of 70 hrs/month or at least 450 hrs during 6 months with at 
least 45 hrs every month over last year) 
SE 
 
 
 
In considering the transitional relationship between sickness and employment, another related 
issue deals with incentives for the employer to prevent employees from relying on social 
security. A typical example are the sickness cash benefits where in many countries the 
employer has to continue paying the salary during the first phase of any claim. The extent to 
which this obligation exists in the different Member States however varies considerably. 
While several countries do not prescribe any statutory continuation of payment of wages for 
the employer, in other countries the obligations for the employer vary between a few days (2 
days: Liechtenstein, Lithuania) up to 2 years (Netherlands). In particular in this last country 
an important increase of the responsibility of the employer was noticeable.  
 
 
 
Statutory continuation  
of payment 
Specification Country 
No continuation derogative provisions 
no derogative provisions 
CY / CZ / DK 
EE / EL / IE / PT 
Up to 2 weeks 2 days 
5 days 
9 days (derogative provisions) 
10 days 
2 weeks 
Up to 15th day 
LT / LI 
RO 
FI 
SK 
BG / HU / LV / SE 
ES / MT 
2 weeks-1 month 16 days 
3 weeks (more through CLA) 
1 month (more through CLA) 
30 days 
> 30 days white collars 
NO 
CH 
IS 
SI 
BE  
1-3 months 33 days 
6 weeks 
6-12 weeks; after that 50% during 4 weeks) 
PL 
DE 
AT 
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More than 3 months month in which disease occurs + 3 months 
up to 6 months 
28 weeks 
104 weeks 
30 to 90 days according to seniority; 
employer pays difference between social 
security benefit and salary 
LU 
IT 
UK 
NL 
FR 
 
III.2. Level of benefits 
 
1. Transition between employment and private activities 
 
Allowing a smooth transition between the different phases of life, may also include the 
possibility of leaving the labour market either partly or completely for a period of time in 
order to take up non-market activities such as spending time at home looking after children or 
sick relatives. As mentioned above, a whole institutional framework has been set up allowing 
people to leave the labour market temporarily. As long as these non-work related periods are 
not taken into consideration for the calculation of the benefits, this might imply a strong 
impediment for a flexible life course as it would lead to a reduced protection. Enhancing the 
value in terms of rights to social protection of such non-market activities is therefore an 
important element in contributing to further flexibility.  
 
Periods related to private or family activities, to education, care or assistance or activities 
outside of the market are, especially for the first pillar of pensions, often taken into account 
although to varying degrees. Concerning periods of parental leave (caring for children), the 
number of years, as well as the age of the child up to which these periods may be taken into 
account, may indeed differ. Cyprus and Malta have recently introduced the possibility of 
accounting for periods of parental leave. Several countries also allow for the possibility that 
career interruption to care for a disabled or seriously ill family member or to undertake a 
programme of study can be taken into account. This latter opportunity in particular 
contributes to the comprehensive lifelong learning strategy ensuring the employability of 
workers.  
 
Reasons to leave temporarily the labour 
market 
Specification Country 
Parental leave (to raise children) 
⇒ Maximum overall duration 
 
 
 
⇒ Maximum age of child 
 
1 year  
2 years 
3 years 
 
3 years 
4 years 
6 years 
8 years 
12 years 
 
ES 
AT 
FR 
 
LI / ES 
CZ 
CY / SK / LU / MT 
LV (only mother) 
IE 
Taking care of disabled member of family  AT / BE / BG / CZ / 
FR / LI / PL / SK / UK 
Study reasons Maximal duration of 6 years 
Age between 18 and 27 years 
Successful graduation as 
condition  
Degree obtained within 
CZ 
LV / LU 
PL / DE / RO 
 
FI / SI / SE 
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maximum 5 years 
 
To the extent that these periods are limited in time and do not compensate for the complete 
loss of entitlements, problems may therefore remain. To address this problem Switzerland has 
for example introduced a system of income sharing between spouses, where the income paid 
by each partner may be summed, divided by two, and counted separately and individually by 
each spouse (splitting system). Indirectly these non-contributory periods can also have an 
impact, due to a proportional reduction of income, and as such may result in a proportional 
reduction of social security.  
 
Many more problems, however, may be encountered in the second and third pillar pensions. 
This will in particular be the case when the first pillar pension is rather low. First of all, in 
general, it might be expected that people with an a-typical working contract, either part-time 
or fixed-term, will have reduced access to company schemes. The fact that membership of a 
second pillar scheme often depends on a minimum period of employment, either with the 
employer or in the sector, might lead to extra difficulties for flexible workers. Portability 
measures will therefore become more and more important.  
 
But also the size of the pension can be affected.13 The size of the pension paid to temporarily 
flexible employees is proportionally reduced by the extent of non-performed working time. It 
may be remembered that in private schemes the scope for redistributive solutions is 
considerably more limited and while periods of unemployment, sickness or disability might 
indeed be taken into account in public schemes, they are generally not in private or 
occupational schemes. In case the scheme includes a provision for equal treatment of 
absences for part-time work and career breaks, the proportionate reduction in the second pillar 
is counteracted. Studies in Belgium have made clear that provision for equal treatment of 
absences can in most instances be back-dated for employees who take a career break but 
never for part-time employees.14  
 
The further introduction of defined contribution (DC) pension schemes (e.g. second pillar 
schemes in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Switzerland, Hungary, Slovak Republic) where the 
level of benefits is closely linked to the number of contributions paid, might generate 
additional disadvantages for workers whose careers are interrupted by periods of non-activity. 
A similar problem can also be found in the NDC (Notional Defined Contribution) pension 
systems that have been installed in recent years in some Member States (introduced first in 
Sweden, later followed in Latvia and Poland). This model features individual accounts that 
are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. As both NDC and DC schemes are designed to tie 
benefits closely to contributions, they are generally less redistributive than defined benefit 
plans, substantially undermining retirement security for low income workers or for those 
without a strong attachment to the labour force. Although it involves less redistribution than 
under a defined benefit model, it generally does include some redistribution and in particular, 
most countries with NDC schemes provide some notional credit thanks to financing from the 
government for time spent out of the paid labour force to care for young children, recognising 
as such non-contributory periods, so that personal accounts continue to accumulate.  
                                             
13 While career breaks may have an impact on the size of the pension, this will not be the case with respect to 
participation to such a scheme as one is indeed already member or not.  
14 See Brosens, G., Peeters, H., Verschraegen, G., Debels, A., Van Gestel, V, and Berghman, J., Impact of 
increased labour market flexibility on social security: a study of the social protection of flexible employees in 
pension provisions, KU Leuven, 2005. 
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A new and growing phenomenon increasingly used in big companies and based on labour 
agreements, is designed to save money or time in ‘working time accounts’. In general, we can 
distinguish between short-term (flexi-time programmes) and long-term accounts (time 
banking schemes). Short-term accounts serve to register the difference between the working 
hours actually carried out and the standard hours specified in the employment contract. Long-
term accounts aim to save up time and so allow credits to be accumulated. Working-time 
accounts allow for blocks of paid leave, during which time the employment contract is 
maintained, allowing for a redistribution of time throughout working life.  
 
An example can be found in the Netherlands where in 2006 the life course saving system 
(LCSS) came into force. The basic idea behind the LCSS is that people can reserve a portion 
of their income to offset losses of income in the future. The LCSS offers individual 
employees the opportunity to save funds to finance periods of unpaid leave for various 
purposes (to take care of ill child, take sabbatical leave, take early retirement…), while 
continuing the original employment relationship. Employees may save a maximum of 12% of 
gross salary per annum income tax free (after saving 12% of the gross salary for two years, 
one can pay for three months of leave on full salary). The maximum saving amounts to 210% 
of the last earned gross salary. Employees receive a tax credit of EUR 185 per year of 
participation in the LCSS when taking up leave. When someone joins the life-course savings 
scheme part of the gross salary is deducted. This is paid into a special savings account. In 
consultation with the employer it is possible to convert saved time, like extra holidays, 
overtime hours and days due to shorter working hours, into money.  
Saving is tax-free. Only when money is withdrawn must income tax be paid as well as 
income-related contributions for health and social care insurance. Contributions for 
employees insurances are also deducted from the deposit for the life-course savings scheme 
so that this scheme does not affect any unemployment insurance allowance or occupational 
disability allowance. 
 
Also, in the manifesto of the new recently installed government in Belgium, a system of time-
banking is proposed which will allow a better combination of family and work. In Germany a 
special law on part-time retirement – although this could be seen as a way to full early 
retirement - allows employees to work full-time up to five years and for zero hours during the 
next five years within a period of up to ten years. This is a kind of special time-account.  
 
 
2. Transition between invalidity/unemployment and employment 
 
An active labour market policy15 looks to facilitate the transition between employment and 
unemployment/disability by trying to integrate people quicker into the labour market, 
allowing them to combine better the receipt of benefits with the income from work. Looking 
at the accumulation of a disability pension with work, we can divide different categories of 
countries. 
 
Some countries are not in favour of it and do not allow the combination of a disability pension 
with work. This is for example the case in Ireland, Italy and Malta. In these countries, 
recipients of an invalidity pension are precluded from both employment and self-employment.  
 
                                             
15 See Ditch, J. and Roberts, E., Integrated approaches to active welfare and employment policies, Dublin, 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2002. 
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The second category of countries do to a certain extent allow a combination of invalidity 
pensions with work. However, there are conditions which must be observed, such as approval 
or authorisation or declaration from a medical advisor from the insurance company (Belgium, 
Greece) or by placing a limit on the amount that may be accumulated, leading as a result to a 
suspension or a reduction of the benefit in case earnings exceed certain ceilings (the 
Netherlands, Cyprus, France, Luxembourg, Greece, Austria, Poland, Finland, and more 
recently the UK and Hungary). In Spain, accumulation with earnings is possible, provided the 
activity is consistent with the pensioner’s physical condition and does not imply a change in 
his or her capacity to work for revision purposes. In other countries, an unlimited and 
unconditional accumulation with work is possible (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak 
Republic, Estonia and recently the Czech Republic).  
 
The situation is slightly different if one compares between the possibility of accumulating 
unemployment benefits with disability pensions. Indeed, here accumulation is very limited - 
as we have seen not all countries provide partial disability benefits - and only a few countries 
allow the combining of these two benefits (e.g. the Czech Republic, Spain, Cyprus and 
Latvia), although some of them under certain circumstances. In Cyprus, one is entitled to the 
pension/benefit with the highest amount. In Spain, accumulation is possible in case the 
disability pension is compatible with the work from which the unemployment benefit is 
derived. In Latvia, possibilities for accumulation increased, as more people are now allowed 
to accumulate, in particular now also people belonging to category 3 (i.e. with a slight or 
limited incapacity of work). 
 
 
3. Transition between employment and retirement 
 
Transitions between different phases of life not only imply facilitating entry to the labour 
market but also exit from the labour market. Social security should in that respect guarantee a 
flexible and gradual retirement. Flexible retirement schemes allow people, on the one hand, to 
continue working after the legal retirement age and, on the other hand, to reduce working time 
in advance of complete retirement. The first way to regulate withdrawal from the labour 
market is via the retirement age and the age for eligibility for early retirement. While it was 
usual in established schemes for early retirement to lead to significant reductions in the value 
of the pension, the general policy trend is towards the encouragement of a later average 
retirement age.16  
 
• Discourage early retirement 
 
Early retirement is often not permitted or is gradually removed. Many countries pose as a 
condition for early retirement a long insurance period varying between 15 years (Estonia) and 
40 years (Slovenia) as a result of which people may retire between two years (Cyprus, 
Germany) or even 10 years (Portugal) before the official retirement age. In some countries 
there is no age condition (Greece, Slovak Republic). Several states have particular rules for 
people who have been working under special circumstances (persons in arduous work or even 
raising children under certain conditions (Estonia). While in several countries, early 
retirement results in a reduction in the pension amount just as a result of the application of the 
pension formula, in other countries an extra reduction (penalty) factor is applied.   
  
                                             
16 The information is limited to the data inserted in the MISSOC Tables, covering general statutory schemes. 
Flexibility between different retirement schemes for special categories of people is therefore not envisaged.  
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Conditions for early retirement 
 
Specification Country 
Not permitted / abolished No specification 
Gradual abolition 
Abolished from 1/7/2008 
IE / NL / NO / SE / UK 
AT 
LV 
Specific conditions Only people older than 65 years 
Only people born after 01/01/1949 
Only seamen 
Only for ‘arduous labour 
 
For raising (grand)children 
DK 
PL 
IS 
BG / EE / GR / IT / ES / 
RO 
EE 
Long-term insurance period 15 years 
480 months 
25 years 
35 years 
37 years 
40 years 
EE 
LU 
CZ 
BE / DE / MT 
GR / IT 
SI 
Maximum period for opening 
right to early pension before legal 
retirement age 
2 years 
 
3 years 
4 years 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
 
10 years 
CH (first pillar) / CY / 
DE / SK 
CZ/ EE / FI 
LI / MT 
BE / FR (insured with 
severe disability under 
certain conditions) / LU 
(between 5 and 10 years 
depending on conditions 
or specific categories / SI 
PT 
Reduction factor 0.9 % for every 90 days 
0.4 % per month 
0.5 % per month 
0.6% per month 
4.2% per year 
6.8 % per year  
80% of normal pension 
CZ 
EE / LT 
PT / SE / SK 
FI 
AT 
CH 
LV 
 
 
 
• Encourage deferred retirement 
 
While early retirement is not promoted, retiring at a later age is clearly encouraged in almost 
all countries. An additional bonus is paid to persons who retire at a later age, although still 
differences exist between the countries. Ireland does not allow for the possibility of 
deferment. In Belgium and Malta deferment does not directly yield a higher pension, although 
it may yield a higher pension indirectly through payment of extra contributions (additional 
years might be allowed to fill the number of years needed to obtain the maximum amount) or 
the fact that additional pensions might increase the reference wage. In Latvia and Bulgaria 
additional years of contribution are taken into account in the formula of calculation. In 
Norway there is no particular increase of the pension. The same rules of calculation apply, but 
the recalculation based on the pension points earned during the deferment, is made only after 
the pensioner reaches 70 years of age.  
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In the last three years several countries have clearly further encouraged the possibility of 
postponing the retirement age (Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, UK and Italy). Most of the 
countries allow unlimited deferment, with the exception of a few countries where deferment is 
only possible up to a certain age or after a certain number of years.  
 
Extra financial compensations for deferred retirement Country 
The person continues to earn pension rights also after the age of 65 and as long as 
he/she continues to work. No extra financial compensation for deferred retirement 
SE 
1.5% for every 90 days of economic activity during which the claim for an old-age 
pension is postponed 
CZ 
0.9% per month, unlimited EE 
0.5% per calendar month (in IS up to maximum of 30% and age 72) CY / IS 
0.5% per calendar month DE / SK 
0.6% per calendar month FI 
0.5% of the pension for each 30 days of additional service time HU 
4.2% per year, to a maximum of 12.6% of the benefit.  AT 
3% in the first year after retirement age; 2.6% in the second; 2.2% in the third; 1.8% in 
the fourth and 1.5% in the fifth or each additional year 
SI 
first pillar: between 5.2 and 31.5 % depending on the number of months of deferment CH 
first pillar: increase on an actuarial basis of between 5.22% for 1 year and 40.71% for 6 
years 
LI 
3.6% for each supplementary year RO 
8% per year, up to 5 years LT 
Rate applied to calculation basis is increased by 2% for each additional year of 
contribution up to 100% and over 100% after 35 years of contributions 
ES 
percentage calculated on actuarial principles according to length of deferment + 
supplement to old age pension per month after the age of 65. 
DK 
3% per insurance year beyond 35 years for age between 65 and 67 GR 
from 7.5% to 10.4 % per year UK 
0.33% per month if insured between 15-24 years and 1% per month if insured during 
more than 40 years 
PT 
0.75% for age 60 + 40 years activity, for each additional quarter from 1st to 4th quarter 
s/he contributed, then by 1% for each additional quarter and after the age of 65 by 
1.25% per each additional quarter 
FR 
If activity is continued beyond 65 years of age, contributions at charge of the insured are 
reimbursed at the end of the year  
LU 
social pension: 120 months; supplementary pension until age of 75 DK 
Maximal age of 67 years GR 
Maximal age of 68 years CY 
Maximal deferment period of 5 years LT 
 
4. Some other elements of influence 
 
Calculating final pension entitlement on the basis of salary levels in the last years of 
employment tends to increase unequal treatment especially for those with different patterns of 
career development and as such might also endanger flexibility in the transition between 
employment and retirement. Schemes that only look at a final salary or a limited number of 
best years, disregard extended periods of flexible work or low income periods. 
 
Taking into account a long period of income or even the entire career may attenuate periods 
with low income and as such represent an advantage. Not many countries today make 
reference to a limited number of years at the end of career as starting point for calculation of 
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the pension benefit. Exceptions include Greece, where entitlement is based on wages from the 
last five years, as well as Spain, where the contribution basis for the calculation are the 180 
months immediately prior to the date of retirement.  
 
Most countries allow for the linking (accumulation) of earnings from employment with 
receipt of old-age benefits. Some countries provide only for an accumulation if the earnings 
are below a certain amount (Slovenia, France, Italy), whereas income above certain limits 
leads to a reduction with a certain percentage (Belgium, Denmark, Iceland) or even to a 
withdrawal if the income is too high (Belgium, Iceland). In Hungary, working activities are 
not restricted, but pensions accumulated with earnings are now subject to taxation, although 
the amount of tax from pensions (tax rate for pensions 0%) is deducted only from the 
accumulated amount. Only in Spain is payment of the pension immediately suspended if a 
paid professional activity is pursued. In Iceland, income from work is not taken into account 
in case where pensioners are 70 years or older. 
 
The situation is slightly stricter in case of early retirement. In that situation, many more 
countries impose limits (Luxembourg, Malta and Norway) or even forbid every accumulation 
(Estonia, Czech Republic, Romania, Latvia). 
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IV. Social Protection and Active Inclusion: Results achieved so far 
 
The renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs has achieved results in the sense that 
growth has picked up, and the overall EU employment rate is rising. However, there is little 
doubt that much more is needed to mobilise the full potential of Europe’s human resources. 
Despite the reforms pursued, there is still a sizeable number of people with little prospect of 
finding or keeping a job who therefore remain at risk of falling into poverty and social 
exclusion. In general, Member States have embraced the active inclusion approach and, in 
doing so, acknowledge more clearly that people’s right to play an active role in society needs 
to be supported. Consequently, most Member States made efforts to ensure that economic and 
labour market reforms are accompanied by provisions to protect the most vulnerable groups.  
 
 
  IV.1.  Measures targeting the low-skilled and the low-paid 
 
Within this context, several Member States took measures to improve the employment 
chances for the low-skilled. In the UK, for example, low-skilled job seekers are subject to 
specific activation measures including support for placement from the employment services. 
Germany and France created financial incentives for employers to hire low-skilled people. 
Other countries provided specific training opportunities for this group either through public 
employment services or on the job. Examples of this can be found in the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Austria, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria. France and Denmark also developed and 
improved the programmes for basic literacy of adults. In addition, Austria, Belgium, Finland 
and France started to subsidise household work with the aim of increasing employment 
opportunities for the low skilled and the low paid; an example that will be followed by the 
Netherlands in the near future.17 Sweden as well started to subsidise household work but with 
the aim to improve and ease reconciliation with family life. Furthermore, a number of 
countries lowered tax wedges in order to foster participation rates and job creation. For 
example, in Sweden, Austria, France, Italy, Malta Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and 
Lithuania general tax reductions were introduced so as to cut the tax wedge on low income 
groups. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Greece and Slovenia, on the other hand, launched 
a straight reduction of the tax burden on low incomes, whereas Belgium, Sweden and Malta 
reduced social security contributions for both employers and employees.18  
 
 
IV.2. Measures targeting migrants and ethnic minorities 
 
A number of Member States took also measures to strengthen the employment position of 
migrants and ethnic minorities. In Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Austria and Cyprus, for 
example, specific training and language courses have been offered to migrants, whereas other 
countries, like Germany, Estonia and the UK, specifically aimed activation measures and job 
search support at this group. In Sweden and Denmark this sort of measure has been combined 
with wage subsidies so as to enhance the employment chances for migrants and their 
descendants. The Netherlands and Lithuania, on the other hand, took steps to better integrate 
migrants’ children into the education system. France and the UK launched specific 
                                             
17 See the Commission’s Strategic Report on the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: launching the 
new cycle 2008-2010, COM(2007) 803 final, p. 56. 
18 See the Commission’s Strategic Report on the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: launching the 
new cycle 2008-2010, COM(2007) 803 final, p. 57. 
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programmes for geographic areas where migrants are highly concentrated. Moreover specific 
measures have been taken to fight discrimination against this group and to promote their 
participation in civic life more broadly. Some Member States are also developing plans to 
attract highly skilled migrants, which counts for example for the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Cyprus and Lithuania. Other countries are planning to simplify the procedures for work and 
residence permits in sectors where there are labour shortages. This is the case, for example, in 
Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Estonia, Malta, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, 
Lithuania and Slovenia.19 
 
 
IV.3. Measures targeting the unemployed 
 
In addition, some Member States increased spending and/or raised the effectiveness of their 
active labour market programmes, for example, by increasing the effectiveness of job search 
assistance (Belgium and Slovakia), by providing targeted training for the unemployed 
(Austria) or by introducing ‘in-work’ benefits (Sweden and France) or a return to work bonus 
for long-term unemployed (France). Some countries also subsidise self-employment. This 
happens for example in Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia. Other Member 
States rather focused on strengthening the individual responsibility of job seekers, for instance 
by increasing the conditionality of unemployment benefits, a more stringent monitoring of job 
search activities and by making job seekers’ rights and obligations more explicit in contracts 
concluded between the job seeker and the employment service. A number of Member States 
intensified the internal cooperation between the different agencies serving job seekers. 
Examples of this can be found in the Netherlands, Ireland, Hungary, Malta and Slovakia.20  
 
 
IV.4. Measures targeting people with disabilities 
 
Moreover, a number of Member States implemented measures targeted at people with 
disabilities. Within this context, Ireland, Estonia and Slovakia created financial incentives to 
encourage this group to take up work, while subsidies are given to encourage employers to 
hire them and to adapt workplaces to their needs in the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Ireland, 
Slovenia, Austria, Latvia and Bulgaria. In Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Germany, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic measures are also being taken to develop 
guaranteed jobs and supported employment opportunities for those who face reduced work 
capacity.21 While some Member States target their actions more in particular to people who 
are physically disabled, others are addressing this issue more broadly, for example by 
improving access to mainstream measures, by paying attention to the importance of living 
independently and by offering better access to quality social services. However, in general, 
less attention is given to those who suffer from mental illnesses and disabilities.22 
 
                                             
19 See the Commission’s Strategic Report on the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: launching the 
new cycle 2008-2010, COM(2007) 803 final, p. 57. 
20 See the Commission’s Strategic Report on the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: launching the 
new cycle 2008-2010, COM(2007) 803 final, p. 57. 
21 See the Commission’s Strategic Report on the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: launching the 
new cycle 2008-2010, COM(2007) 803 final, p. 57. 
22 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2007, as adopted by the Council on 22 February 2007, 
6694/07, p. 7. 
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V. The way forward and leads for further improvements 
 
V.1. Enhance employment security 
 
Tackling the risk of poverty and (future) social exclusion of the underprivileged requires a 
balanced mix of labour integration policies and paying special attention to those who do not 
work or are involved in precarious work. An ageing Europe in an increasingly competitive 
world needs more people working in a stable work environment. For many people this is the 
main safeguard against poverty and social inclusion.  
 
Bringing this about requires a shift from the traditional attitude concentrating on job security 
towards the broader concept of employment security. It also demands improved access to 
quality jobs so as to allow people to integrate and progress in the labour market and to 
adequate benefits during transition periods. Workers will be more inclined to take the risks 
associated with job transfers, if these transitions provide income support combined with real 
prospects for new and better jobs. This sort of measure should go hand in hand with 
contractual arrangements that put in place the right conditions for skills- and career 
development and for combating discrimination in the labour market. Public authorities should 
lay the foundation for this sort of measure by providing a legal framework, thereby leaving 
sufficient room for the social partners to take specific measures which promote, for example, 
job retention, flexible work arrangements for disadvantaged groups, suitable recruitment 
procedures and the availability of quality jobs. The system should include measures that 
prevent workers from becoming unemployed by sustaining safe job-to-job transitions. 
Employers, social partners, public employment services and temporary work agencies should 
work together to organise these transitions as soon as it becomes clear that redundancy is 
likely.23   
 
 
V.2. Ensure that income support and activation rules complement each other 
 
It is important that this type of measure is backed up by modern social security schemes 
which offer effective support to bring those who are excluded from the labour market back to 
work. In encouraging disadvantaged groups to take up work, modern social security schemes 
should seek to combine active and personalised job searching support and skills training, with 
adequate incentives that make work pay, satisfactory levels of income support and high 
quality social services. Indeed, this is a major challenge for policy makers who also have to 
take account of the budgetary cost that this may involve. Seen from this perspective 
increasing the conditionality for benefit receipt may be seem to be an effective way out. After 
all, making the entitlement of benefits conditional on active job search, participation in 
training and willingness to work, can help to keep budgetary cost within limits, whilst at the 
same time encouraging job seekers to accept job offers made to them. The current trend 
towards making benefits more strictly conditional suggests that many Member States have 
embraced this concept. However, it should be kept in mind that linking income support to 
activation policies will only result in well-balanced outcomes if this sort of policy is carefully 
                                             
23 Commission’s Communication COM(2007) 359, Towards common principles of flexicurity: more and better 
jobs through flexibility and security, p. 14-17. 
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designed. If these two aspects of social protection do not adequately complement each other, 
unintended consequences may follow.  
 
Experience shows, for example, that activation policies which are over-reliant on conditional 
rules can press benefit recipients to accept inappropriate or low quality jobs. This can put 
them in precarious situations, especially since these sorts of jobs often leave little room for 
skills- or career development. Consequently, they may have to leave the job sooner or later, 
due to inadequate employment skills or insufficient support to address underlying personal or 
social hurdles. At the end of the day this may have the effect of pushing the weakest members 
of society further into social exclusion.24 This effect may be reinforced when benefits 
schemes which provide minimum income protection drive beneficiaries to take up any job 
offer, whether suitable or not, and lower, or even withdraw entitlement to these benefits when 
they refuse. Experience shows that this may lead to situations where a significant share of 
those targeted by such schemes may not actually benefit from them, either because they 
cannot claim their entitlement so long as they don’t accept work or because the income 
support provided becomes insufficient to participate fully in society due to sanctions which 
reduce the benefit level for a certain period of time.25   
 
 
V.3. Find a proper balance between activation, alleviating poverty and budgetary costs 
 
To break out of this spiral, it is vital to improve the interaction between economic and 
employment policies for growth and jobs and the Union’s strategies for social protection and 
social inclusion. Member States should be more aware of the fact that social protection 
policies should not only effectively contribute to mobilise people who are capable of working, 
but also contribute to achieving the wider objective of providing a decent living standard to 
those who are excluded from the labour market. Social protection reforms should therefore 
focus in particular on finding a proper balance between enhancing employment activity 
without creating trap effects, whilst at the same time improving the adequacy of social 
benefits and ensuring better access to social services. 26  
 
If effective progress in curbing the risk of social exclusion is to be achieved, it is fundamental 
that these three elements are interlinked. Policy makers should realise that without active 
support for labour market integration, there is a real danger that minimum income schemes 
trap people in long-term benefit dependency. However, they should also realise that these 
schemes should provide adequate levels of minimum resources to all. Without appropriate 
income support, there is the risk that active labour market programmes fail to prevent 
widespread poverty. In turn, this may increase the risk of ill-health and encourage people to 
                                             
24 See the synthesis report of the Commission Services on the public consultation on active inclusion following 
the Commission’s Communication concerning a consultation of action at EU level to promote the active 
inclusion of people furthest from the labour market, Com (2006), 44 final, p. 3. 
25 A study covering 13 Member States reveals that between 2 and 13% of the population in these countries have 
to live at some point below the national, more or less guaranteed, minimum income level. See for more details 
on this matter: I. Nicaise, ‘Gaps, traps and springboards in European minimum income systems, HIVA - KU 
Leuven and Loughborough University (CERP), 2004. Account should be taken of the fact that the minimum 
income schemes across the Member States vary greatly in terms of the extent to which basic income support is 
linked to other policy components such as labour market policies and access to services. See the synthesis report 
of the Commission Services on the public consultation on active inclusion following the Commission’s 
Communication concerning a consultation of action at EU level to promote the active inclusion of people 
furthest from the labour market, COM(2006) 44 final, p. 5. 
26 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2007, as adopted by the Council on 22 February 2007, 
6694/07, p. 5. 
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seek immediate sources of subsistence by irregular means, such as undeclared work or even 
crime. In addition, it may increase the demand for other social programmes, such as health 
care and family allowances that would take on some of the burden of poverty relief. On top of 
that policy makers should be aware of the fact that access to social services is a pre-condition 
for being available to work, especially for those who find themselves at the margins of the 
labour market. Without adequate social support, there is a risk that activation rules are 
implemented without due regard to the particular needs of people at disadvantage. Thus, the 
effectiveness of these rules can be seriously reduced. After all, if these rules are implemented 
blindly, there is a real danger that the hurdles that disadvantaged groups may encounter in 
entering mainstream society will not be adequately addressed.27  
 
 
V.4. Take the common principles for active inclusion into account 
 
The open method of coordination can be a powerful instrument to promote a more holistic 
approach in which the three main strands of active inclusion are interlinked. To help the 
Member States to take more account of the linkages between these three strands, the 
Commission has proposed to deepen the open method of coordination through the adoption of 
a set of common principles. These principles reflect the main elements of each of the three 
strands and thus provide a concrete analytical framework for their implementation, thereby 
respecting the autonomy and the different situations and needs of the Member States.28  
 
In line with the 1992 Recommendation on income support, the first set of common principles 
refers to the recognition of the basic right of each person to sufficient resources and social 
assistance to live in a manner compatible with human dignity.29 Member States should make 
the recognition of this right subject to general principles including active availability for work 
or for vocational training for those whose age, health and family situation permits such active 
availability. For other persons, Member States should make this right, where appropriate, 
subject to economic and social integration measures. Member States should also take 
appropriate steps to implement this right, thereby taking account of the practical guidelines 
regarding the amount of resources considered sufficient to cover essential needs.30 
 
The second set of common principles refers to the Employment Guidelines nr. 19 and stresses 
the importance of breaking down barriers to the labour market by taking measures as 
specified by this Guideline. The third set highlights the need to provide quality social services 
and underlines the importance of ensuring their accessibility, availability and affordability. 
The principles related to this strand also define the ‘quality’ aspect and make clear that the 
social services to be provided should include assistance to persons facing personal challenges 
or crises, such as unemployment, over-indebtedness, drug addiction or a family breakdown, 
                                             
27 See the synthesis report of the Commission Services on the public consultation on active inclusion following 
the Commission’s Communication concerning a consultation of action at EU level to promote the active 
inclusion of people furthest from the labour market, COM(2006) 44 final, p. 8. 
28 See, in this respect, the Commission’s Communication COM(2007) 620, Modernising social protection for 
greater social justice and economic cohesion: taking forward the active inclusion of people furthest away from 
the labour market, p. 6. 
29 See Recommendation 92/442/EEC of 27 July 1992. See also Recommendation 92/441/EEC of 24 June 1992. 
The first established as a common objective the guarantee of a minimum level of resources and the second set 
out the principles and guideline by which this objective could be achieved.  
30 See in this respect the Commission’s Communication COM(2007) 620, Modernising social protection for 
greater social justice and economic cohesion: taking forward the active inclusion of people furthest away from 
the labour market, p. 6-7. 
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activities to ensure that the persons concerned are able to completely reintegrate into either 
society or the labour market, activities to ensure access to affordable child care, activities to 
integrate persons with long-term health or disability problems and social housing.31  
 
The implementation of these sets of principles will be supported at the EU level by a 
systematic monitoring and evaluation exercise within the framework of the open method of 
coordination. Experience shows that this can help the Member States in developing an 
appropriate policy mix to foster active inclusion. Progress in this area can not only be 
achieved by the exchange of good practices; the common principles might also add value by 
providing a common format against which Member States can compare and assess their 
policy instruments. The Commission can play a major role in this process. After all, within 
the Union’s system of assessment and reporting, it is up to the Commission to identify the 
most relevant challenges for each Member State. The Commission also evaluates progress, 
gives feedback to the Member States, makes proposals for adjusting specific policy 
instruments and, if necessary, reports on serious difficulties to the European Council on the 
basis of which the Council can formulate country specific recommendations for each Member 
State.32 On top of that, the Commission can encourage Member States to make use of the 
provisions of the new ESF regulation to support active inclusion measures and strengthen the 
involvement of relevant stakeholders by taking steps to reinforce the interaction between 
national and EU policy levels and the regional and local levels where implementation largely 
take place. However, when it comes to the crunch, the success of the envisaged approach will 
eventually depend on the capacity of individual Member States to produce a well-balanced 
policy package in which activation measures, adequate levels of income support and adequate 
social services are interlinked. This is a major challenge for the Member States in the coming 
years.  
 
 
                                             
31 See in this respect the Commission’s Communication COM(2007) 620, Modernising social protection for 
greater social justice and economic cohesion: taking forward the active inclusion of people furthest away from 
the labour market, p. 8.  
32 See the Commission’s Communication COM(2005) 24, Working together for growth and jobs: a new start for 
the Lisbon Strategy, p. 31-33. 
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